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A generalization of the quantum cryptographic protocol by Bennett and Brassard is discussed,
using three conjugate bases, i.e. six states. By calculating the optimal mutual information between
sender and eavesdropper it is shown that this scheme is safer against eavesdropping on single qubits
than the one based on two conjugate bases. We also address the question for a connection between
the maximal classical correlation in a generalized Bell inequality and the intersection of mutual
informations between sender/receiver and sender/eavesdropper.
03.65.Bz, 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
In 1984 Bennett and Brassard [1] suggested a quantum cryptographic protocol, in the following called BB84, which
enables two parties to establish a secret key, using principles of quantum mechanics. In this scheme the sender of the
quantum information, usually called Alice, transmits quantum bits in the basis | 0〉, | 1〉 or the conjugate basis | 0¯〉, | 1¯〉,
defined by
| 0¯〉 = 1√
2
(| 0〉+ | 1〉)
| 1¯〉 = 1√
2
(| 0〉 − | 1〉) (1)
to the receiver Bob, who performs measurements in these bases. After classical communication via a public channel
a secret key can be established by using only those cases in which the bases of Alice and Bob coincide.
In this paper we want to discuss a generalized scheme which is based on the use of three rather than two bases.
The third one used in addition to the previous ones is denoted by | 0¯〉, | 1¯〉 and defined by
| 0¯〉 = 1√
2
(| 0〉+ i| 1〉)
| 1¯〉 = 1√
2
(| 0〉 − i| 1〉) . (2)
In the Bloch vector picture a density matrix ̺ is written as ̺ = 1
2
(1l + ~s · ~σ), with ~s being the Bloch vector and ~σ
the Pauli matrices. The six states can be viewed as Bloch vectors pointing along the positive and negative x-, y- and
z-directions. Alice sends one out of these, denoted as |ψin〉, with equal probability.
Such a scenario is a straightforward extension of the traditional protocol and its possibility has been mentioned
at various occasions [2]. Our main purpose is to point out that this generalized scheme is principally more secure
than the one in [1]. This is due to the fact that the optimal strategy an eavesdropper, traditionally called Eve, can
design to gather information by performing some unitary transformation on the quantum bit in transit, gives her in
our scenario less information for a fixed disturbance of Bob’s qubit. As Alice increases the set of inputs it is more
difficult for Eve to learn something in transit.
It was conjectured in [3] and shown in [4] that in the BB84 scenario the disturbance corresponding to Bob and Eve
possessing the same information with respect to Alice exhibits a connection to the CHSH inequality. After deriving
Eve’s optimal strategy we will ask whether in the generalized protocol the crossing point between the two relevant
mutual informations has a connection to a generalized Bell inequality where Alice and Bob use the observables ~ai ·~σa
and ~bi ·~σb, {i = 1, 2, ..., n}, respectively, with the Bloch vectors ~ai,~bi spanning not only a plane, but the Bloch sphere.
After this introduction and outline of the paper let us derive the eavesdropping strategy that is optimal with respect
to the mutual information between Alice and Eve, IAE . We do not consider collective or coherent attacks, but only
interaction with single qubits. The most general unitary transformation Eve can design is of the form
U | 0〉|X〉 =
√
F | 0〉|A〉+
√
1− F | 1〉|B〉 (3)
U | 1〉|X〉 =
√
F | 1〉|C〉+√1− F | 0〉|D〉 . (4)
The first qubit is the one sent to Bob and acted on by Eve. Eve’s initial state is |X〉, and |A〉, |B〉, |C〉, |D〉 refer to
her normalized states after the interaction. It was shown in [5] that it is sufficient for Eve to use two qubits in order
to extract the maximal information. The fidelity of Bob’s bit is F and is taken to be in the interval 1/2 ≤ F ≤ 1.
We assume Eve to be clever enough to treat all six possible states in the same way (i.e. with same disturbance for
Bob) - otherwise Alice and Bob could find out about her existence by comparing error rates in different bases. This
assumption results in three constraints which the scalar products of Eve’s states have to fulfill:
1
〈B |D〉 = 0 ,
Re〈C |A〉 = 2− 1
F
,
〈A |B〉 + 〈D |C〉 = 0 . (5)
Unitarity of the matrix U means
〈A |D〉 + 〈B |C〉 = 0 . (6)
The mutual information between Alice and Bob is given by
IAB = 1 +D logD + (1−D) log(1 −D) , (7)
where D is the disturbance of Bob’s qubit, defined by
D = 1− F = 1− 〈ψin |̺B|ψin〉 , (8)
and ̺B is the right hand side of equations (3) and (4), traced over Eve’s bits. All logarithms are taken to base 2. By
construction Bob’s disturbance is the same no matter which state was sent by Alice. The procedure to calculate the
mutual information between Alice and Eve is more involved. We expand
|A〉 = αA| 00〉+ βA| 10〉+ γA| 01〉+ δA| 11〉 , (9)
where the complex coefficients have to satisfy
|αA |2 + |βA |2 + | γA |2 + | δA |2 = 1 (10)
and similarly for |B〉, |C〉, |D〉. We are free to choose |B〉 as one of the four basis vectors, e.g. |B〉 = | 00〉 and
can fulfill the first constraint in equation (5) by setting |D〉 = | 11〉, without loss of generality. We then find for the
mutual information the form
IAE = 1 + 1
2
(τ [F |αA |2 + (1− F ), F |αC |2] +
τ [F |βA |2, F |βC |2] +
τ [F | γA |2, F | γC |2] +
τ [F | δA |2 + (1− F ), F | δC |2]) , (11)
where we define
τ [x, y] = x log x+ y log y − (x+ y) log(x+ y) . (12)
Note that −τ [x, 1 − x] is the entropy function. Equation (11) is the mutual information which Eve reaches when
postponing the measurement until she learns which basis was used by listening to the public channel.
The task is to maximize IAE with the constraints of eq. (5) and (6). The method of Lagrange multipliers leads to
a set of equations which can not be simultaneously fulfilled unless αA = αC = 0 and δA = δC = 0. This means that
the best solution for Eve is to use states such that 〈A |B〉 = 0 = 〈C |D〉, which one would have expected.
Now we have only two parameters left, βA and βC , and can write
IAE = 1 + 1
2
F (τ [|βA |2, |βC |2] + τ [(1 − |βA |2), (1− |βC |2)]) , (13)
which is a concave function. Here we have used
τ [Fx, Fy] = Fτ [x, y] . (14)
It is straightforward to write down the system of equations which has to be fulfilled in order to maximize IAE . Due
to their high symmetry one can find one solution easily, namely
|βA |2 = 1− |βC |2 , (15)
and thus
IAE = 1 + F · τ [|βA |2, 1− |βA |2] . (16)
2
By checking the higher derivatives one confirms that this is a maximum, which is, due to concavity, the absolute
maximum. Inserting into the second line of eq. (5) allows us to find the ‘best’ relative phase between |A〉 and |C〉
and thus leads to the solution for the highest mutual information that Eve can extract from measuring her two qubits,
IAE = 1 + (1−D) {f(D) log f(D) + (1− f(D)) log(1 − f(D))} ,
f(D) = 1
2
(
1 +
1
1−D
√
D(2− 3D)
)
. (17)
This function is shown in figure 1, where we also give the corresponding mutual information for BB84, taken from [4],
for the purpose of comparison. (IAB is identical in both cases.) Note that our curve lies everywhere below the one
for the BB84 case. The six state protocol is therefore more secure against eavesdropping on single qubits.
In our case both bits of Eve carry mutual information, unlike the one described by [4]. If she would either measure
only one of her two bits, or if she would use a 1-bit probe from the beginning, her maximal information would be
IAE,1bit = 1 + f1(D) log f1(D) + (1− f1(D)) log(1− f1(D)) ,
f1(D) =
1
2
(
1 +D +
√
D(2− 3D)
)
, (18)
which is the lowest curve in figure 1. The calculation for the 1-bit probe follows the same line as explained above for
the 2-bit probe, but is less involved. Note that in order to maximize her mutual information in the six-state scheme
Eve necessarily needs two qubits as resource, whereas for BB84 a 1-bit probe is sufficient to reach optimality [6].
It is worth mentioning that the optimal unitary transformation which leads to equation (17) disturbs all Bloch
vectors in the same way, not only the six states used by Alice, and allows Eve to gain the same information in all possible
bases. In other words: the optimal eavesdropping action for six states is shown to be a universal transformation. This
means that using a bigger number of states cannot increase security. The gain in security described in this paper is
due to the fact that the three bases are spanning the full Bloch sphere, as opposed to the case of BB84 where only a
two-dimensional plane is spanned.
The scheme described in [1] can also be realized by Alice and Bob sharing a singlet, i.e. a maximally entangled
state. This was discussed in [7,8]. In this case, which we will consider for the rest of this article, Alice and Bob can
test for eavesdropping by calculating S, the correlation coefficient in the CHSH inequality. Without any disturbance
of Bob’s bit they will find |S | = 2√2. This value is decreased when Eve interacts unitarily with Bob’s bit. As
was shown in [4], the intersection of the two curves for IAB and IAE corresponds to |S | = 2, i.e. at disturbances
D ≥ 1
2
(1− 1/√2) the CHSH inequality (between Alice and Bob) is not violated.
The natural question arises whether the corresponding intersection for the generalized scheme is related to a
generalized Bell inequality. In the six-state protocol the reduced density matrix of Alice and Bob after Eve’s interaction
reads
ρAB =
1
2


D 0 0 0
0 1−D 2D − 1 0
0 2D − 1 1−D 0
0 0 0 D

 (19)
where the matrix elements are written in the order 00,10,01,11. For any number of measurement directions that Alice
and Bob can use to test a Bell inequality we find
|S(D) | = |Sq | · (1− 2D) (20)
where Sq denotes the correlation for D = 0, i.e. the undisturbed singlet. Thus in our case the measurement directions
that are optimal for the singlet are also optimal for D 6= 0, i.e. a mixed state. This does not hold in general [9]. We
will refer to the disturbance where |S(D) | = |Sc |, i.e. where S reaches the classical limit, as Dc.
Let us first look at the case where Alice and Bob are using two measurement directions each that do not necessarily
lie in a plane. Here the inequality for a model with local hidden variables reads |S | ≤ 2.
We can make use of Cirel’son’s inequality [10] in which the norm of the operator
C = ~a1 · ~σa ⊗~b1 · ~σb + ~a2 · ~σa ⊗~b1 · ~σb + ~a2 · ~σa ⊗~b2 · ~σb − ~a1 · ~σa ⊗~b2 · ~σb (21)
is shown to obey ||C|| ≤ 2√2. (Here ~ai refer to Alices directions of measurement and ~bi to those of Bob.) This
means that the maximal value the quantum correlation can take is |Sq | = 2
√
2, no matter whether the measurement
directions span a plane or a sphere. This value is reached in the CHSH scenario. One can intuitively understand this
3
in the following way: in order to maximize the sum of scalar products of the measurement directions their relative
angles have to be as small as possible, i.e. they have to lie on a great circle of the sphere. Thus we cannot find a ratio
for |Sq/Sc | that is higher than
√
2 and therefore we cannot establish a Bell inequality in the sphere that corresponds
to the intersection of IAE with IAB for the generalized protocol, because here Dc is larger than in BB84.
We can generally exclude such a correspondence for n measurements by each party, i.e. chained Bell inequalities
[11]: the inequality reads now |S | ≤ 2n−2. The relevant operator C for this case can be written as a sum of operators
of the form used in Cirel’son’s inequality which we call C1, ..., Cn−1. Due to the inequality
||C|| = ||C1 + C2 + ...+ Cn−1|| ≤ ||C1||+ ...+ ||Cn−1||
≤ (n− 1) · 2
√
2 (22)
we know an upper limit of the quantum correlation. Thus we find |Sq/Sc | ≤
√
2 as in the paragraph above and can
generally exclude the mentioned connection.
Note that inequalities like the original Bell inequality and a recent suggestion by Ardehali [12] where two directions
of measurement coincide cannot be used for our purpose: the eavesdropping interaction causes the expectation value
〈~a · ~σa ⊗ ~a · ~σb〉 to be smaller than 1 if D > 0.
To summarize, we have discussed a quantum cryptographic protocol based on six quantum states and shown that it
is safer against eavesdropping on single qubits than the BB84 scheme, because Eve’s maximal mutual information is
smaller than in the BB84 scenario. Furthermore, in order to reach the maximal mutual information the eavesdropper
needs to use a two-bit probe and thus has to perform a more complicated transformation than in BB84. If her resource
consists of only one qubit, she gains even less information. We have to mention some practical disadvantage: in order
to establish a key one will here loose 2/3 of the signals rather than 1/2 in the BB84 scenario, when using equal
probabilities for all states. We have also shown that the best way to test a CHSH inequality is to use measurement
directions that lie in a plane. In the six-state protocol there is no natural relation between the classical limit of a Bell-
type correlation coefficient and the intersection of the information curves. We hope that this cryptographic scheme
may reach practical relevance in the light of recent suggestions to produce maximally entangled pairs of distant atoms
[13], see also [14].
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FIG. 1. Maximal mutual information IAE between Alice and Eve as function of Bob’s disturbance D. The upper curve holds
for BB84 [4] and is shown for the purpose of comparison. The lower curves refer to the six-state protocol. Their analytic forms
are shown in equations (17) and (18). The mutual information between Alice and Bob is in both scenarios given by the curve
I
AB.
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